Torts: Praying for the Parish or Preying on the Parish? Clergy Sexual Misconduct and the Tort of Clergy Malpractice by Short, Emily C.
Oklahoma Law Review 
Volume 57 Number 1 
1-1-2004 
Torts: Praying for the Parish or Preying on the Parish? Clergy 
Sexual Misconduct and the Tort of Clergy Malpractice 
Emily C. Short 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr 
 Part of the Religion Law Commons, and the Torts Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Emily C. Short, Torts: Praying for the Parish or Preying on the Parish? Clergy Sexual Misconduct and the 
Tort of Clergy Malpractice, 57 OKLA. L. REV. 183 (2004), 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol57/iss1/9 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Oklahoma Law Review by an authorized editor of University of 
Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact darinfox@ou.edu. 
Torts: Praying for the Parish or Preying on the Parish?
Clergy Sexual Misconduct and the Tort of Clergy
Malpractice
L Introduction
Clergy sexual misconduct, from child abuse' to parishioner2 affairs,3
permeates society, affecting nearly every religious institution.4 Incidents of
clergy sexual abuse have been reported in more than thirty-five states,5
impacting congregations and congregants alike. The tort remedies currently
available for clergy sexual abuse are limited to battery, negligent or intentional
infliction of emotional distress, breach of fiduciary duty, respondeat superior,
and negligent hiring and supervision. These torts are often difficult to prove
or are not fully accepted by many courts. Introducing the tort of clergy
malpractice would provide victims of clergy sexual abuse a more feasible
remedy to recover for their emotional and physical losses.
To date, no U.S. court has accepted clergy malpractice as a viable tort6 for
fear of problems with excessive governmental entanglement with religion or
difficulty in defining an appropriate standard of care.7 Such fears are
unwarranted because developing clergy malpractice does not require judicial
activism and will not excessively entangle the government in defining
religious doctrine. Instead, courts may look to secular documents adopted by
the church regarding personnel policies to define the standard of care. By
looking to wholly secular documents, a court need only interpret the
reasonableness of the policy, not the religious doctrine itself. With the
1. See INVESTIGATIVE STAFF OF THE BOSTON GLOBE, BETRAYAL: THE CRISES IN THE
CATHOLIC CHURCH (2002) [hereinafter BETRAYAL] (detailing accounts of sexual abuse of
minors by Catholic clergy in the Boston diocese).
2. For the purposes of this comment the terms, "parish" and "congregation" are used
interchangeably to indicate church members as a group; while "parishioner" and "congregant"
are used to indicate an individual church member even though different religions refer to their
church members with different terms.
3. See ANNIE LAURIE GAYLOR, BETRAYALOFTRUST: CLERGY ABUSE OFCHILDREN (1988),
available at http://www.ffrf.org/betrayaloftrust.htnl (last visited June 16,2004) (explaining that
clergy abuse comes in many forms, including rape, sexual harassment and exploitation, and
spousal abuse).
4. See infra notes 20-26 and accompanying text.
5. Associated Press, Catholic ChurchAbuse State-by-State, TULSA WORLD, Apr. 28, 2002,
at A10 [hereinafter State-by-State].
6. Dausch v. Rykse, 52 F.3d 1425, 1432 (7th Cir. 1994).
7. Enderle v. Trautmann, No. CIV. 13-01-22, 2001 WL 1820145, at *4 (D.N.D. Dec. 3,
2001).
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enormous scandal facing the United States today, courts must look closer at
the detrimental effects of clergy malpractice to realize that the benefits of
allowing a tort of clergy malpractice outweigh the fears.
This comment examines the importance of adding clergy malpractice to the
torts available to protect victims and to provide compensation for their losses.8
To better understand why the tort of clergy malpractice is necessary, it is
imperative to discuss the current climate and scope of the sexual abuse crisis.
Part 1I explains the scope of the sexual abuse crisis in the United States,
specifically examining the current media coverage, the church's response, and
the layperson response. Part I details the current tort remedies for victims
of clergy sexual misconduct. This part discusses battery, negligent or
intentional infliction of emotional distress, breach of fiduciary duty,
respondeat superior, and negligent hiring and supervision, specifically
examining the acceptance and rejection of each tort in its application. Part IV
defines clergy malpractice. Part IV.A provides a history of clergy malpractice.
Part IV.B provides the clergy malpractice definition proposed by this
comment. Part IV.C details the duties and responsibilities of the clergy
necessary to establish the foundation for clergy malpractice and the various
standards of care. Parts 1V.D and IV.E examine the problems with clergy
malpractice and offer solutions to avoid these problems. Part V illustrates the
proper application of clergy malpractice necessary to persuade the courts to
allow for this tort by demonstrating the reasons behind accepting the tort of
clergy malpractice and offering a hypothetical application to the current
sexual abuse crisis in the Catholic Church.
II. Understanding the Scope of the Sexual Abuse Crisis in the United States
Sexual abuse by clergymen is not an uncommon problem. In fact, the
statistics are startling. "[O]ne in every four clergymen has had some form of
sexual contact with a parishioner and one out of ten has had an affair."9 A
1997 British study of the Church of England found that 67% of survey
respondents knew a colleague who engaged in inappropriate sexual conduct
with a parishioner." In another survey, between 10% and 38% of all clerical
respondents reported some level of sexual contact with a parishioner.1"
8. For the purposes of this comment, the recent sexual abuse scandal of the Catholic
Church will be used to illustrate the viability of the clergy malpractice tort.
9. John H. Arnold, Clergy Sexual Malpractice, 8 U. FLA. J.L. &PUB. POL'Y 25,26 (1996).
10. Thaddeus Birchard, Clergy Sexual Misconduct: Frequency and Causation, 15 SEXUAL
& RELATIONSHIP THERAPY 127, 135 (2000).
11. Janice D. Villiers, Clergy Malpractice Revisited: Liabilityfor Sexual Misconduct in the




According to The Christian Science Monitor, at least seventy-five clerics have
been convicted of child sexual abuse since 1985.12 An April 2002 survey
conducted by the Center for the Prevention of Sexual and Domestic Violence
in Seattle found that in 1993, 70% of Southern Baptist ministers knew of other
ministers who had sexual contact with a parishioner. 3 A recent survey
conducted by the Associated Press found that churches removed more than
200 priests from their church duties since January 2002, and during that time
period victims filed at least 300 civil suits alleging sexual misconduct. 4 The
Dallas Morning News reported that "60[%] or more of U.S. bishops have been
accused of failing to stop sexual abuse or covering up past crimes."' 5 In
England, the Roman Catholic Church has apologized for its handling of
pedophile clerics in England and Wales after a former priest was sentenced to
five years for assaulting children and the BBC reported that the church failed
to act in a number of suspected abuse cases. 6 The clergy sexual misconduct
scandal reaches as far as Australia 7 and South America." As these statistics
make clear, sexual relationships between clergymen and their parishioners are
a problem - one that is receiving increased and highly publicized media
coverage.
Although much of the sexual abuse scandal has surrounded the Roman
Catholic Church,'9 other religions have faced sexual abuse problems in the
past. In 1992, the Presbyterian Church U.S.A. estimated that 10% to 23% of
its clergy had participated in "inappropriate sexual behavior or... contact."2
In November 2002, a prominent New York Presbyterian minister who had
served the church for more than thirty years left the ministry after facing
charges that he sexually abused adolescent boys.2' In the last fifteen years,
12. Gayle White, Sexual Misconduct: Keeping Vigil: How Various Faiths Protect the
Innocent in Their Flocks, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Sept. 14, 2002, at B 1.
13. Id.
14. Bob von Sternberg, Insurance Falls Short in Church Abuse Cases; Catholic Dioceses
are Forced to Find Other Sources to Pay Settlements, STAR TRIBUNE (Minneapolis, Minn.), July
27, 2002, at Al.
15. Terry Mattingly, Zero Tolerance? What About the Bishops? Now ... About the
Bishops, TOPEKA CAPITAL-JOURNAL, July 27, 2002, at El.
16. Warren Hoge, British Cardinal Apologizes for Ignoring Warnings About a Pedophile
Priest, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2002, at A10.
17. Jeremy Calvert, Critics Shut out of Pell Inquiry, HERALD SUN (Melbourne), Oct. 1,
2002, at 9.
18. Signs of the Times: Clergy Abuse Cases Becoming Public in South America, AMERICA,
Nov. 11, 2002, at 4.
19. BETRAYAL, supra note 1.
20. James T. O'Reilly & Joann M. Strasser, Clergy Sexual Misconduct: Confronting the
Difficult Constitutional and Institutional Liability Issues, 7 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 31, 34 (1994).
21. Lisa W. Foderaro, Minister Quits After Allegations of Abuse, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16,
2004]
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four American rabbis have lost their positions because of sexual contact with
parishioners.22 In 1990, the United Methodist Church reported that nearly 23%
of laywomen reported being sexually harassed by either their pastor or another
minister."3 Additionally, Buddhist teachers were accused of sexual
misconduct.24 A survey of evangelical ministers reported that "23% admitted
to engaging in sexually inappropriate conduct, and 12% admitted to having
sexual intercourse" with a parishioner.25
This comment, however, will focus on the Roman Catholic Church's
response and how the tort of clergy malpractice could easily apply to the
existing situation. Recent media coverage illustrates the pervasiveness of the
sexual abuse scandal within the Roman Catholic Church. Cities across the
country have reported cases of sexual abuse by current and former Catholic
clergy. The Boston Globe's investigative staff compiled information about the
scandal in the Boston diocese and published a book detailing the scandal.26
Indeed, newspapers in twenty-seven states have reported incidents of sexual
misconduct by clergy or response to the clergy misconduct scandal, 27 and the
2002, at B5.
22. O'Reilly & Strasser, supra note 20, at 34.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 34-35.
26. BETRAYAL, supra note 1.
27. See Associated Press, Downstate Priest Takes Leave as Abuse Case Reopens, CHI.
TRIB., Sept. 22, 2002, at C5; Attorney Picked to Investigate Clergy Misconduct Allegations,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, July 12, 2002, at 9B; Ziva Branstetter, Diocese OK'd Prior
Settlements, TULSA WORLD, Aug. 7,2002, at Al; Chronology, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, Sept.
19, 2002, at 5A; Mike Chalmers, Church Board Faces Criticism, NEWS J. (Wilmington, Del.),
Sept. 23, 2002, at IA; Virginia de Leon, Catholics Unite Amid Scandal; Parishioners Want
Accountability, Aid for Victims, SPOKESMAN-REV. (Spokane, Wash.), Dec. 3, 2002, at B1;
Richard C. Dujardin, Local Priests Say Crisis Not Keeping Believers Away, PROVIDENCE J.-
BULL., Dec. 15, 2002, at A25; Michael Fisher, Two Sisters Allege Abuse by Priest, PRESS-
ENTERPRISE (Riverside, Cal.), Sept. 20, 2002, at B9; Krista Gustafson, Bishop Releases Sex
Misconduct Policy for Diocese, ST. CLOUD TIMES (St. Cloud, Minn.), July 2, 2003, at B 1;
Bonnie Harris & Judith Cebula, Priest Quits, Admits Past Misconduct, INDIANAPOLIS STAR,
Sept. 6,2002, at IA; Bill Hart & Joseph A. Reave, Romley Calls Diocese Slow in Inquiry, ARIZ.
REPUBLIC, Sept. 25, 2002, at B 1; Ron Howell, Mending Old Wounds; In Brooklyn, Clergy
Abuse Survivors Use Talk Therapy to Heal, NEWSDAY (New York, N.Y.), Dec. 15,2002, at A8;
Timothy Hurley, Banished Priest to Leave Ministry, HONOLULU ADVERTISER, May 22,2003 at
B2; Kim Kozlowski, 2 Priests Guilty in Abuse Cases, DETROIT NEWS, Dec. 19, 2002, at ID;
William R. Levesque, Memo Warned Priest Against Meeting Kids, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES,
Sept. 13, 2002, at B 1; Paul Logan, N.M. Church Leaders Say They Kept Abusers on Board,
ALBUQUERQUE J., June 16, 2002, at B 1; Kathryn Marchocki, Lawyer: Bishop's Actions Key in
Scandal, UNION LEADER (Manchester, N.H.), Sept. 20, 2002, at B3; Terry Mattingly, Baptists'
Tradition Make It Hard to Oust Sex-Abusing Clergy, KNOXVILLE NEWS-SENTINEL, June 22,




Associated Press has reported incidents of sexual misconduct by clergy in
more than thirty-five states.28
A. The Roman Catholic Church's Response to the Crisis
Within the last fifteen years, the Catholic Church has focused its attention
on clergy sexual abuse against minors, trying to provide justice and healing
to victims while also providing redemption and assistance to offenders. 29 The
United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB) is the hierarchical
assembly of bishops in the United States that promulgates the rules for each
diocese.30 The USCCB's purpose and function under civil law is "' [t]o unify,
coordinate, encourage, promote and carry on Catholic activities in the United
States."' 3' As the governing body of American Catholic Bishops, the USCCB
offers assistance to dioceses regarding their policies.32
Most religious denominations have addressed the problem of sexual abuse
and exploitation and have adopted a policy on sexual abuse by their clergy.33
The United Methodist Church, the Baptist Convention, the Episcopalian
Church, the African Methodist Church, the Presbyterian Church, the
Assembly of God, and the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints have
written policies regarding sexual misconduct that require them to report sexual
misconduct to the proper authorities.'
The Catholic Church's response to sexual misconduct has spanned fifteen
years of varying policy. In 1982, the USCCB received its first question
OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Aug. 23, 2002, at B 1; Norm Parish, Area Priest in Sex Case is
Laicized by Pope, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Aug. 8, 2002, at B4; Shirley Ragsdale, Diocese
Faces 4th Abuse Lawsuit, DES MOINES REGISTER, Sept. 19, 2003 at B 1; Peter Smith, Suits
Accusing Dead Priests Raise Tough Issues for Church, Families, COURIER J. (Louisville, Ky.),
Sept. 2, 2002, at 1 A; Staff, Pastor in Roanoke Accused of Sex Abuse; He Is Suspended Pending
Outcome of Church Investigation, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Aug. 27, 2002, at A1; Staff, Dallas Priest
Still on Job Despite Claims of Abuse, HOUSTON CHRON., Nov. 12, 2002, at A16; Nicole Tsong,
Seven Priests Abused Children, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Oct. 30,2003, at A1; von Sternberg,
supra note 14, at Al; Heather Wecsler, Diocese Starts Healing Process, NEWS-STAR (Monroe,
La.), June 20, 2002, at 3A; Ann Wlazelek, Allentown Priest Will Give Up Post Pending Review,
MORNING CALL (Allentown, Pa.), Sept. 12, 2002, at BI.
28. State-by-State, supra note 5, at A10.
29. United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, Efforts to Combat Clergy SexualAbuse
Against Minors: A Chronology, at http://www.nccbuscc.org/comnkit2.htm (last visited July
12, 2004) [hereinafter Catholic Bishops, Efforts to Combat Clergy Sexual Abuse].
30. United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, Who We Are, at http://www.nccbuscc.
org/ocyp/whoweare.htm (last visited July 11, 2004).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. White, supra note 12, at B1.
34. Id.
2004]
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regarding liability for sexual molestation by clergy members." Within three
years, the USCCB and several state conferences began developing personnel
policies regarding sexual abuse and misconduct.3 6 The initial policy suggested
removal of the offender, referral of the offender for professional medical
evaluation, prompt offering of solace and support to the victim, protection of
confidentiality, and compliance with civil law obligations.37 Throughout the
1990s, the Catholic bishops developed policies regarding the sexual abuse of
minors, but in June 2002, the USCCB developed the leading document on how
to handle sexual abuse of minors within the Catholic Church.38 At the 2002
annual conference in Dallas, Texas, the U.S. Catholic Bishops developed the
most comprehensive sexual abuse policy to date - the Charter for the
Protection of Children & Young People (the Charter)39 - and established the
National Review Board to assess the Church's progress.4 ° The Charter
garnered much praise for its zero-tolerance stance on sexual misconduct by the
clergy, yet the Vatican made several changes before officially approving the
Charter.4 A committee of Vatican officials and American bishops altered the
Charter by reforming the policy to provide more due process rights to the
accused cleric.42
The Charter adopted the words of Pope John Paul II, stating that "sexual
abuse of young people is 'by every standard wrong and rightly considered a
crime by society; it is also an appalling sin in the eyes of God."' 43 The
Charter defines sexual abuse to include "contacts or interactions between a
child and an adult when the child is being used as an object of sexual
gratification for the adult"" and provides a detailed policy of response with
an emphasis on reaching out to the victims.45




39. UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, CHARTER FOR THE PROTECTION
OFCHILDREN & YOUNG PEOPLE (2002), available at http://www.usccbuscc.org/bishops/charter-
final.pdf [hereinafter CHARTER].
40. Catholic Bishops, Efforts to Combat Clergy Sexual Abuse, supra note 29.
41. Editorial, The Bishops and Zero Tolerance, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2002, at A30.
42. See Frank Bruni & Laurie Goodstein, Panel of Bishops Completes Changes to Zero-
Tolerance Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2002, at A18; Laurie Goodstein, Bishops Pass Plan to
Form Tribunals in Sex Abuse Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2002, at Al.
43. CHARTER, supra note 39, at 2.
44. ld. at 5 n.*.




The Charter requires that each diocese extend its commitment to the victims
by providing counseling, spiritual guidance, and support groups.46 Each
diocese must establish its own review board to assess the merits of sexual
misconduct charges and fully investigate such charges.47 Moreover, no
diocese may enter into a confidentiality agreement, except for special
circumstances brought by the victim. 48 The document further emphasizes that
the diocese should cooperate with public authorities.4 9 Additionally, the
Charter permits a diocese to remove a priest or deacon from his clerical duties
during a preliminary investigation.5° If a cleric admits to engaging in sexual
abuse or an appropriate investigation establishes sexual abuse, the Church will
promptly and permanently remove the offender, or if removal is not applicable
(because of age or infirmity), the offender must lead a life of prayer and
cannot "celebrate Mass publicly," "wear clerical garb," or "present himself
publicly as a priest."51
Additionally, the Charter establishes an Office for Child and Youth
Protection at the USCCB's national headquarters and a National Review
Board of laypersons to assist the office and monitor the application of the
Charter.52 The National Review Board was originally chaired by the
Honorable Frank Keating, the former governor of Oklahoma,53 and consists
of eleven additional Catholic laypersons.54 The Charter, the Office for Child
and Youth Protection, and the National Review Board create the framework
for handling sexual abuse cases in the Catholic Church.55
46. Id.
47. Id. at 6.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 7.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 8.
52. Id. at 10.
53. United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, Governor Frank Keating of Oklahoma
to Chair American Bishops' Advisory Panel for New National Office for Child and Youth
Protection, available at http://www.nccbuscc.org/comnarchives/2002/02-112.htm (last visited
June 14, 2002). On June 17, 2003, Frank Keating resigned from his position as chair of the
advisory panel amidst objections for publicly criticizing several church leaders. Jim Myers,
Keating's Letter Offers No Apology, TULSA WORLD, June 17, 2003, at Al.
54. United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, Membership of National Review Board
Announced, at http://www.nccbuscc.org/comm/archives/2002/02-147.htm (last visited July 15,
2004). The other eleven board members are: Robert S. Bennett, Anne M. Burke, Michael J.
Bland, William R. Burleigh, Nicholas P. Cafardi, Jane Chiles, Alice Bourke Hayes, Pamela D.
Hayes, Paul R. McHugh, M.D., Leon E. Panetta, and Ray H. Siegfried, II. Id.
55. In January 2004, the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops released an audit
of the implementation of the Charter. United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, Executive
Summary, Compliance Audits, Analysis of the Findings, and Recommendations, at
http://www.nccbuscc.org/ocyp/audit2003/sectionone.htm (last visited Jan. 11, 2004); see also
2004]
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In December 2002, the Bishops established and approved the policy when
assessing an allegation of sexual abuse of a minor by incorporating the Charter
and Canon law into EssentialNormsforDiocesan/Eparchial Policies Dealing
with Allegations of Sexual Abuse of Minors by Priests or Deacons (the
Norms), which is binding on all American dioceses. 6 The Norms require that
each diocese must have a "written policy on the sexual abuse of minors by
priests and deacons" and must "designate a competent person to coordinate
assistance" for victims. 7 Additionally, the Norms call for a review board to
process allegations, which must consist of at least five people, including one
priest and one person experienced in the treatment of sexually abused
minors."
In addition to establishing the written policy requirement and the review
board, the Norms establish the due process necessary for an allegation.59 The
Norms create the appropriate steps in an investigation, which include limiting
duties or removal, but also encourages the accused to retain counsel to provide
an opportunity to be heard.6" The new policy attempts to safeguard both the
accused and the victim's rights in a dispute.
B. The Layperson Response to the Crisis
In the wake of the Catholic Church's sexual abuse scandal, laypeople have
rallied together for support and to effectuate change within the church.
Laurie Goodstein, Dioceses Are Moving Ahead on Abuse, Audit Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7,
2004, at A14; Patrick Healy, Clerics' Sex Abuse Victims Say Lay Boards Ignore Them, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 6, 2004, at B5. The auditor's report found that the dioceses are the beginning of
implementing the new process. The audit found "all dioceses and eparchies to be compliant
with some or all of the articles of the Charter." Id. The audit focused on each diocese and
provided a comprehensive analysis of the implementation in that diocese. Id. According to the
report on the Archdiocese of Oklahoma City, "[a]t the conclusion of this audit, the Archdiocese
of Oklahoma City was found to be compliant with the provisions of the Charter." United States
Conference of Catholic Bishops, Archdiocese of Oklahoma City, at http://www.nccbuscc.org/
ocyp/audit2003/oklahomacityok.htm (last visited Jan. 11, 2004). At the conclusion of the audit
of the Tulsa Diocese, that diocese was issued one recommendation to "submit criminal
background requests on all active clergy to the Oklahoma State Bureau of Investigation." United
States Conference of Catholic Bishops, Archdiocese of Tulsa, athttp://www.nccbuscc.orglocyp/
audit2003/tulsaok.htm (last visited Jan. 11, 2004).
56. United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, Essential NormsforDiocesan/Eparchial
Policies Dealing with Allegations of Sexual Abuse of Minors by Priests or Deacons, at









Although there have been clergy sexual abuse support organizations for nearly
a decade,6 the Catholic Church has increasingly recognized their presence and
their ability to influence the Catholic community.62 For more than a decade,
The Linkup,63 with help from its 5000 members, has assisted victims and
survivors of clergy sexual abuse and has helped establish accountability in
churches and other religious institutions.' 4
In 1992, former victims of sexual abuse and misconduct by clergy formed
the Survivors Network of those Abused by Priests (SNAP) to help men and
women who were sexually abused by spiritual leaders.65 An all-volunteer
group, SNAP maintains an active online self-help discussion arena and
provides local chapter meetings.' In addition to providing support for victims
and survivors of sexual abuse, SNAP works for change by lobbying Catholic
dioceses and state legislatures to increase punishment for offending priests.
67
Voice of the Faithful,68 the most recently formed survivor group, began in
January 2002 with twenty-five people gathered in a small church in
Massachusetts and has grown to a membership of over 25,000 people.
69 This
group's main goal is to effectuate change by supporting survivors and priests
of integrity and by encouraging structural change within the Church.
7"
Specifically, Voice of the Faithful plans to assess the Bishops' and dioceses'
compliance with the Church's new policies on sexual abuse by offering a
report card on each diocese.7 In fact, Voice of the Faithful's criticism of the
handling of the abuse scandal and its outcry for change within the church
garnered a meeting with Boston Archdiocese Cardinal Bernard Law.
72
61. See, e.g., The Linkup - Survivors of Clergy Abuse, at http://www.thelinkup.org (last
visited June 20, 2004).
62. See infra note 72 and accompanying text.
63. See, e.g., The Linkup - Survivors of Clergy Abuse, at http://www.thelinkup.org (last
visited June 20, 2004).
64. The Linkup - Survivors of Clergy Abuse, Our Mission, at http://www.thelinkup.
com/mission.html (last visited June 20, 2004).
65. See SNAP (Survivors Network for those Abused by Priests), at http://www.survivors
network.org (last visited July 15, 2004).
66. Id.
67. Laurie Goodstein, Victims' Group Uses Spotlight to Seek Changes in Law, N.Y. TIMES,
May 10, 2002, at A28.
68. See Voice of the Faithful, at http://www.votf.org (last visited July 15, 2004).
69. Id.
70. Voice of the Faithful, Our Mission Statement, at http://www.votf.org/Who-We-Are/
mission.html (last visited July 15, 2004).
71. Michael Paulson, Catholic Group to Rate Bishops, BOSTON GLOBE, July 20, 2002, at
Al.
72. Pam Belluck, Group Formed Over Scandal Wins Meeting with Cardinal, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 30, 2002, at A25. Additionally, Voice of the Faithful requested Cardinal Law's resignation
2004]
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Because public outrage concerning the sexual abuse scandals is increasing,
the need for a remedy for victims and survivors of clergy sexual abuse is more
apparent. The response within the community echoes the need to reassess
current tort law to determine the best remedy for clergy misconduct.
III. Current Theories of Civil Liability in Clergy Sexual Misconduct Cases
Currently, tort actions against an offending cleric and his church are limited
by the available causes of action. To recover for inappropriate sexual
misconduct, most survivors file claims of battery, intentional or negligent
infliction of emotional distress, breach of fiduciary duty, respondeat superior,
or negligent hiring and supervision.73 Courts have both accepted and rejected
these causes of action with little consistency, leaving survivors with more
questions than answers.
A. Battery
Sexual misconduct is an unwanted touching,74 and the actual act of
touching in clergy sexual misconduct often falls within the tort of battery.
Civil battery liability requires that the accused act "intending to cause a
harmful or offensive contact" with the person and the harmful contact
"directly or indirectly results."75  In many sexual misconduct cases, the
elements necessary to prove battery are present.76
Importantly, battery does not evoke questions regarding First Amendment
protection.77 Therefore, this tort presents an opportunity to seek civil damages
from the cleric for sexual misconduct. However, the elements for establishing
battery limit the scope of recovery to only the actual offender.78 Indeed,
battery cannot apply to the church or any supervisor who knew of the abuse
as Cardinal of the Archdiocese of Boston, which later occurred in December 2002. See Pam
Belluck & Frank Bruni, Scandals in the Church: The Overview; Law, Citing Abuse Scandal,
Quits as Boston Archbishop and Asksfor Forgiveness, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2002, at Al.
73. O'Reilly & Strasser, supra note 20, at 39-59.
74. Battery is defined as "[t]he application of force to another, resulting in harmful or
offensive contact." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 146 (7th ed. 1999).
75. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 13 (1965).
76. Gagne v. O'Donoghue, No. CA 941158, 1996 WL 1185145 (Mass. Super. Ct. June 26,
1996) (involving a count of sexual assault and battery relating to physical, sexual, and emotional
abuse of an altar boy by a priest).
77. John Trevor Wood, Note, Causes ofAction in Missouri Against the Church and Clergy
for Sexual Misconduct in Gibson v. Brewer, 65 UMKC L. REV. 1027, 1031 (1997).
78. In order to prove battery, the court must find that the accused intended to cause the
harmful or offensive contact and that contact actually occurred. This would likely only be





or who knowingly concealed it because these actions fail to satisfy the
elements of battery. This important limitation to battery make it the tort
useful, but not comprehensive.
B. Negligent or Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Many victims, when faced with sexual misconduct or abuse, suffer from
emotional distress in the form of Post-traumatic Stress Syndrome.
79
Symptoms include "depression, suicidal tendencies, self-mutilation," anxiety,
sexual dysfunction, flashbacks, and addictive behavior. 80 The damage to a
victim's mental state continues long after the abuse, as many victims repress
their memories for many years or are afraid to discuss their abuse and are
unable to confide even in close friends, siblings, or spouses.81
The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress occurs when "[o]ne
who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes
severe emotional distress to another" and bodily harm results from the
actions." In comparison, negligent infliction of emotional distress occurs
when the actor "intentionally and unreasonably subjects another to emotional
distress which he should recognize as likely to result in illness or other bodily
harm.''83 The actor is subject to liability even if he did not intend to inflict the
harm.
84
Sexual misconduct by clergy seems to fall within the definition of either
negligent or intentional infliction of emotional distress; however, courts have
not readily accepted the application of these torts.85 Courts and juries alike
have been reluctant to accept clerical misconduct claims because of the
difficulty in weighing outrageous conduct and the fear of infringing upon
religious doctrine.86 In the context of sexual misconduct, emotional distress
might be easier to prove, but courts nevertheless remain leery of extending this
tort. In fact, courts have refused to apply intentional infliction of emotional
distress based on sexual misconduct in counseling relationships with
parishioners.87 While child sexual abuse seems to be a clearer example of
79. Youtha C. Hadman-Cromwell, Power and Sexual Abuse in Ministry, 48 J. REUGIOUS
THOUGHT 65, 67 (1991).
80. Id. at 67-68.
81. BETRAYAl, supra note 1, at 80.
82. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 46(1) (1965).
83. Id. § 312.
84. Id.
85. Meroni v. Holy Spirit Ass'n for Unification of World Christianity, 506 N.Y.S.2d 174
(App. Div. 1986).
86. Strock v. Pressnell, 527 N.E.2d 1235, 1238-39 (Ohio 1988).
87. Schieffer v. Catholic Archdiocese, 508 N.W.2d 907, 911 (Neb. 1993); see also
Langford v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 705 N.Y.S.2d 661 (App. Div. 2000) (refusing to apply
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outrageous conduct, courts rarely permit the application of emotional distress
to it."
C. Breach of Fiduciary Duty
Sexual misconduct within the church has deeply affected its victims, as
evidenced by the increasing number of support groups and organizations
fighting clergy abuse.89 Most parishioners see their priest, pastor, or minister
as one whom they can trust with complete confidence. A fiduciary is "[o]ne
who owes to another the duties of good faith, trust, confidence, and candor,"9 °
and a fiduciary relationship establishes a "duty to act for the benefit of the
other on matters within the scope of the relationship."'" Clergy members fall
within these definitions because they set themselves apart as counselors and
confidants to their parishioners, instilling a deep sense of trust and security.92
Indeed, clergy have superior authority because of their entrenchment in the
particular religious institution and their representation of God.93
Although the fiduciary relationship and subsequent duty seem apparent,
courts are divided in their application of the tort of breach of fiduciary duty
to clergy. The Michigan Court of Appeals refused to allow a cause of action
for breach of fiduciary duty arising out of a sexual relationship between a
parishioner and her pastor, who was acting as a counselor.94 The court held
that the parishioner could not "establish any imbalance of power in the
relationship or explain why she would repose trust in [the pastor] without
resorting to the fact that [he] was her pastor,"95 thereby making religion the
foundation of the cause of action, "'not merely incidental"' to it.96 The court,
negligent infliction of emotional distress to sexual misconduct in religious counseling
relationship between priest and parishioner).
88. See Osborne v. Payne, 31 S.W.3d 911, 915 (Ky. 2000) (stating that cases of intentional
infliction of emotional distress should "be approached on a case-by-case basis" because there
is no automatic recovery in the clergy/counselor relationship); Borchers v. Hrychuk, 727 A.2d
388,393 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1999) (stating that absent a special relationship from an officially-
sanctioned treatment relationship, sex between a pastor counselor and his parishioner does not
reach the level of "extreme and outrageous conduct"); Langford, 705 N.Y.S.2d at 662
(dismissing a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress because of its similarities to
clergy malpractice, which would require a "'venture into forbidden ecclesiastical terrain"').
89. See supra Part I.B.
90. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 640 (7th ed. 1999).
91. Id.
92. See F.G. v. MacDonell, 696 A.2d 697, 704 (N.J. 1997).
93. Arnold, supra note 9, at 43.
94. Teadt v. Lutheran Church Mo. Synod, 603 N.W.2d 816, 823 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000).
95. Id.




unable to separate religious doctrine from the fiduciary duty, refused to admit
the breach.
Conversely, other courts have found the breach of fiduciary duty as a viable
cause of action because of its lessened requirements as compared to clergy
malpractice. The New Jersey Supreme Court held that a breach of fiduciary
duty claim avoids the excessive entanglement with religion argument and
allows a parishioner to recover for damages suffered from inappropriate
sexual conduct in the counseling relationship.97 In determining the feasibility
of this tort, the court stated, "The First Amendment does not insulate a
member of the clergy from actions for breach of fiduciary duty arising out of
sexual misconduct that occurs during a time when the clergy member is
providing counseling to a parishioner.""8 The court further held that by
accepting the parishioner into a counseling relationship, the cleric also accepts
the responsibility of a fiduciary.99
Currently, courts are more likely to accept a breach of fiduciary duty than
a clergy malpractice claim because they perceive a difference in the degree of
religious entanglement."°° Courts can determine a breach of fiduciary duty
claim through a bright-line approach, which focuses on the existence of a
counseling relationship, determination of a breach through sexual misconduct,
and a rebuttable presumption that the cleric is responsible. '0 Even though this
bright-line approach is definable, the breach of fiduciary duty claim remains
problematic because of the difficulty in defining breach and the reluctance of
courts to allow the claims to stand. Indeed, the Seventh Circuit noted the
difficulty in applying and defining a breach of fiduciary duty in the religious
context because the minister's conduct would have to be measured against a
judicially fabricated standard." 2 Courts that have accepted the tort of breach
of fiduciary duty simply state that courts may define the duty without
excessively entangling religion but should not set a specific standard that
could apply in more than a case-by-case analysis.'0 3 The most common breach
97. MacDonell, 696 A.2d at 703.
98. Id. at 702.
99. Id. at 704.
100. See Enderle v. Trautman, No. CIV. 13-01-22, 2001 WL 1820145, at *5 (D.N.D. Dec.
3, 2001) (stating that "while the clergy malpractice claim may require the development of a
'reasonable clergy' standard, the... standard to which a fiduciary is held is not that of a
'reasonable clergy person' . . . but rather that of a 'fiduciary"') (second omission in original).
101. Zanita E. Fenton, Faith in Justice: Fiduciaries, Malpractice & SexualAbuse by Clergy,
8 MICH J. GENDER & L. 45, 90-91 (2001).
102. Dausch v. Rykse, 52 F.3d 1425, 1438 (7th Cir. 1994); see also Hawkins v. Trinity
Baptist Church, 30 S.W.3d 446,453 (Tex. App. 2000) (applying the Dausch reasoning and not
accepting the tort of breach of fiduciary duty).
103. MacDonell, 696 A.2d at 703-04.
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used in clergy misconduct cases is "sexually inappropriate conduct in the
course of pastoral counseling."'" Such an action presents an example of a
breach but fails to establish a broad definition, leaving the tort of breach of
fiduciary duty to a case-by-case application with little continuity.
D. Respondeat Superior
Oftentimes, victims of clergy sexual abuse file suit against the institutional
church, which has greater assets and insurance to cover its losses. 5 By
focusing on the church, instead of the cleric, the victim faces a more difficult
burden. Under the tort of respondeat superior, a victim must prove that the
cleric executed an intentional tort while in the scope of employment.0 6 "An
act is committed within 'the scope ... of employment' if it is done by virtue
of the employment and in furtherance of the business or interest of the
employer, regardless of the time or motive of the conduct."0 7 Problems arise
with respondeat superior because any intentional tort likely does not fall
within the scope of employment. Indeed, inappropriate sexual conduct is
clearly not within the scope of employment of a church that requires celibacy
of its clerics.'0 8 Because sexual misconduct falls far outside a cleric's duty in
most religions, accepting inappropriate conduct as within the scope of
employment would force a contrived and awkward application of respondeat
superior. "9
Respondeat superior fails in its application to churches for two additional
reasons. First, the action requires foreseeability.1 ° The victim must prove
that the church knew or should have known that the cleric committed or would
commit an intentional tort."' Courts require foreseeability because the
doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply to intentional or willful acts
committed by an agent or employee to vent his own malevolence against
another."'2 Liability based on respondeat superior must correspond to conduct
104. Id. at 703.
105. O'Reilly & Strasser, supra note 20, at 38.
106. Id. at 39.
107. H.R.B. v. J.L.G., 913 S.W.2d 92, 97 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995).
108. Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 287 (Colo. 1988).
109. See also Joshua S. v. Casey, 615 N.Y.S.2d 200, 201 (App. Div. 1994) (stating that
respondeat superior applies liability only when the act was "within the scope of employment and
in furtherance of the employer's business"); Byrd v. Faber, 565 N.E.2d 584, 588 (Ohio 1991)
(stating that respondeat superior was not applicable because the church "in no way promotes
or advocates nonconsensual sexual conduct between pastors and parishioners").
110. O'Reilly & Strasser, supra note 20, at 41.
111. Id. at 39.




characteristic of the church's activities or be reasonably foreseeable." 3
Proving foreseeability is nearly impossible." 4 Second, applying respondeat
superior creates the question of whether the minister or priest is an employee
of the church or merely an independent contractor.' The priest or minister
exercises a large amount of independent judgment without the supervision of
the church or religious denomination." 6 With a disparity in hiring practices
among religious institutions, it is again too difficult to apply respondeat
superior to the church because of the difficulty in defining the employer-
employee relationship and the lack of uniformity in its application.
E. Negligent Hiring and Supervision
The final tort currently applied to clergy misconduct is negligent hiring and
supervision. Negligent hiring and supervision includes the negligence or
recklessness of an employer in giving improper or ambiguous directions,
employing improper persons involving risks to others, failing to supervise the
employee's activity, or permitting or failing to prevent negligent or tortious
conduct." 7 In negligent hiring, a victim must show a "failure to exercise
reasonable care in [selecting] employees," '' and in negligent supervision, a
victim must show a "failure to supervise."' ' The burden of proof for
negligent hiring and supervision is quite high, as victims must prove that the
church retained actual knowledge of misconduct and "ignored the
situation. '"2 ° Additionally, the known hiring of a cleric with previous
misconduct alone is insufficient to prove negligent hiring and supervision.'
The victim must also prove that a foreseeable, unreasonable risk of injury
existed.'22
Courts are split on whether to accept negligent hiring and supervision as
applied to churches for clergy sexual misconduct. Courts rejecting the tort
claim state that "[q]uestions of hiring, ordaining, and retaining clergy,
however, necessarily involve interpretation of religious doctrine, policy, and
113. Id.
114. See Tichenor v. Roman Catholic Church of Archdiocese New Orleans, 32 F.3d 953,
959-60 (5th Cir. 1994); Moses v. Diocese of Colo., 863 P.2d 310, 329 (Colo. 1993); H.R.B. v.
J.L.G., 913 S.W.2d 92, 97 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995).
115. ROBERT W. MCMENAMIN, CLERGY MALPRACTICE 68 (1986).
116. Id.
117. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 213 (1958).
118. Arnold, supra note 9, at 42.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 42-43.
121. Id. at 43.
122. Id.
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administration." 123 The Missouri Supreme Court feared that judicial inquiry
into those practices "would result in an endorsement" of a particular religion
by approving one hiring structure and disapproving another. '24 Furthermore,
the court found that determining reasonableness regarding what the church
"should have known" would create an excessive entanglement with religion
and lead to endorsement of one supervision plan. 125 Furthermore, courts that
reject this claim are adamant that assessing qualifications to be a minister and
appointment and retirement of ministers are "'ecclesiastical matters entitled
to constitutional protection against judicial or other State interference." 1
26
However, the Florida Supreme Court accepted negligent hiring and
supervision in Malicki v. Doe.127 In Malicki, the court stated that the inquiry
into hiring practices does not violate the First Amendment because the
question is "whether the specific danger that ultimately manifested itself...
reasonably could have been foreseen at the time of hiring."'128  By not
questioning the reasons for the hiring, but instead focusing on whether the
problem was foreseeable, the Malicki court removed the First Amendment
barrier and accepted a claim of negligent hiring and supervision. The tort of
negligent hiring and supervision remains a question of how each jurisdiction
will determine the issue. With one side fearing First Amendment
infringement and the other side attempting to secularize the hiring process, a
general consensus is difficult to find.
IV. Clergy Malpractice: A New Remedy for Clergy Sexual Misconduct
The tort of clergy malpractice developed approximately fifteen years ago. 29
Since its initial claim, the tort has received varying applications, from failure
to prevent a parishioner's suicide, 30 and publicizing a relationship between
123. Gibson v. Brewer, 952 S.W.2d 239, 246-47 (Mo. 1997).
124. Id. at 247.
125. Id.
126. Leary v. Geoghan, No. 990371, 2000 WL 1473579, at *1 (Mass. Super. Ct. June 28,
2000) (quoting Alberts v. Devine, 479 N.E.2d 113, 122 (Mass. 1985)).
127. 814 So. 2d 347 (Fla. 2002).
128. Id. at 362.
129. According to one scholar, the first recorded claim against a pastor for clergy malpractice
was for alienation of affection in Carrieri v. Bush, 419 P.2d 132 (Wash. 1966). See Thomas L.
Needham, Malpractice in the Ministry, in CLERGY MALPRACTICE 9, 18 (H. Newton Malony et.
al. eds., 1986).
130. Nally v. Grace Cmty. Church of the Valley, 763 P.2d 948 (Cal. 1988); see also Roppolo
v. Moore, 93-2361 (La. App. 4 Cir. 7/27/94), 644 So. 2d 206 (finding no clergy malpractice
cause of action for wrongful death relating to suicide of parishioner who had a sexual




a clergyman and a parishioner in a sermon and letter, 3' to sexual relationships
developing out of faith or marital counseling, 3 2 and sexual abuse of a
minor. '33
A. The History of Clergy Malpractice
Victims have asserted clergy malpractice as a cause of action since the first
attempt in 1980, in Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley. 3 4 In
Nally, a young man attending the University of California at Los Angeles
sought pastoral counseling from pastors at the Grace Community Church,
befriended the pastors, and later converted to Protestantism.'35 Nally
attempted suicide, and, while in the hospital, apologized to his pastors for not
succeeding and asked them whether he could be "saved" if he committed
suicide. 36 Eleven days later, Nally committed suicide, and his parents sued
Grace Community Church for "clergyman malpractice" in failing to refer their
son for counseling and further treatment.'37 The California Court of Appeals
accepted the theory of clergyman malpractice, finding that the church and the
pastors had a duty of care to refer Nally for additional psychiatric treatment. '38
The court held that "nontherapist counselors - both religious and secular -
have a duty to refer suicidal persons to psychiatrists or psychotherapists
qualified to prevent suicides."'' 39 The California Supreme Court, however, did
not extend the duty as far as the court of appeals. Instead, the California
Supreme Court held that the duty to refer for nontherapist counselors in
general was too broad and beyond the scope of the duties of a counselor,
40
131. F.G. v. MacDonell, 696 A.2d 697, 700 (N.J. 1997) (finding no cause of action for
clergy malpractice for publicizing a private relationship between a clergyman and parishioner,
but allowing a breach of fiduciary duty claim to stand if it passes the First Amendment hurdle).
132. Amato v. Greenquist, 679 N.E.2d 446 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (finding no cause of action
for clergy malpractice from a sexual relationship during faith counseling between a Lutheran
pastor and the plaintiff's wife).
133. Schmidt v. Bishop, 779 F. Supp. 321 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (finding no cause of action for
clergy malpractice from a sexual relationship between a Presbyterian minister and a girl he was
counseling).
134. 763 P.2d 948 (Cal. 1988). Although the California Supreme Court did not decide
Nally until 1988, the case was filed in 1980. No. NCC-18668-B (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct.);
see Ben Zion Bergman, Is the Cloth Unraveling? A First Look at Clergy Malpractice, in
CLERGY MALPRACTICE, supra note 129, at 45, 46 n.5.
135. Nally, 763 P.2d at 950.
136. Id. at 951-52.
137. Id. at 952.
138. Id. at 954.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 955-56.
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and that such accountability would unreasonably place blame and contravene
public policy.'4
Since Nally, courts across the United States have faced the issue of whether
to apply clergy malpractice. Following Nally, analysts predicted both an
increased willingness of people to sue their clergy and of courts to hear such
cases.' 42 This predicted trend has come true, but to date, no court has applied
clergy malpractice' 43 without a relevant statute.'" From fears of First
Amendment violations 4 ' and the inability to define a standard of care, 146 to
avoiding judicial activism, 147 and preventing public policy infringements, 1
48
courts have found more reasons to avoid implementing clergy malpractice
than reasons to endorse it.
B. Defining Clergy Malpractice
Clergy malpractice has received growing attention in the last decade and
has received several definitions as a result. Malpractice in general is defined
as "[a]n instance of negligence or incompetence on the part of a
professional."' 149 Clergy malpractice is "the failure to exercise the degree of
care and skill normally exercised by members of the clergy in carrying out
their professional duties."'5 ° This tort theory "presupposes that every cleric
owes the same duty of care, whatever the religious order which granted
141. Id. at 961.
142. Needham, supra note 129, at 21-22.
143. Dausch v. Rykse, 52 F.3d 1425, 1432 n.4 (7th Cir. 1994). The Alabama, Colorado,
Ohio and Nebraska state supreme courts have held that there is no cause of action for clergy
malpractice. Id. The Missouri and Oklahoma state supreme courts have not accepted clergy
malpractice but have failed to determine the propriety. Id. California, Louisiana, New York and
Pennsylvania state courts have refused to recognize the claim of clergy malpractice. Id.
144. See Odenthal v. Minn. Conf. of Seventh-day Adventists, 649 N.W.2d 426,439 (Minn.
2002) (holding minister liable for malpractice under "unlicensed mental health practitioner"
statute).
145. Lann v. Davis, 34,892 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/22/01), 793 So. 2d 463, 465 (La. Ct. App.
2001) (stating that judicial review of pastoral counseling would cause inquiry into religious
fundamentals and violate "the First Amendment's separation of church and state").
146. F.G. v. MacDonell, 696 A.2d 697,703 (N.J. 1997) (fearing that defining a standard of
care would "embroil" courts in defining the proper training, skill, and standards "in a diversity
of religions with widely varying beliefs").
147. Borchers v. Hrychuk, 727 A.2d 388, 395 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1999) (stating that the
primary reason for refusing to recognize clergy malpractice was the court's adjudicatory role).
148. Alexander v. Culp, 705 N.E.2d 378, 381 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997) (courts have stated that
accepting clergy malpractice would contravene public policy).
149. BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 971 (7th ed. 1999).




ordination, or the cleric serves, or the beliefs espoused,'' and is often
"intended to remedy error in pastoral counsel or advice."' 52 Finally, scholars
have defined clergy malpractice as "(1) a breach of fiduciary duty unique to
practitioners of divinity (2) by outrageous conduct that (3) causes (4) injury
to a client (5) who has relied on the cleric's obligation or moral conduct."'
53
Each definition provides a different approach to applying clergy
malpractice. However, the best definition of clergy malpractice combines
each of these definitions. This comment, will define clergy malpractice as (1)
failure to exercise the degree of care and skill unique to practitioners of
divinity (2) in a parishioner's relationship based on counseling or conduct (3)
by outrageous conduct that (4) causes a definable injury to the parishioner (5)
who relied upon the cleric's advice, moral conduct, or counseling.'54
C. Defining Clerical Duties and Responsibilities to Establish a Standard of
Care
Clergy have many roles in society. Their parishioners know them as
spiritual and secular counselors, public speakers, interpreters, educators,
scholars, and mentors in addition to their roles as congregational leaders. The
counseling role developed out of the priest's position in medieval Europe as
the only educated or literate person in the community, and people sought a
priest's counsel for both pragmatic and spiritual problems.'55 Each religious
organization defines its clergy differently, but collectively clergy are "persons
ordained for religious services."' 156 To accept the tort of clergy malpractice,
clergy must be accepted as professionals. A professional is "[a] person who
belongs to a learned profession or whose occupation requires a high level of
training and proficiency."'' 57 Analyzing the definitions of clergy and
professional, the view of the clergy as professionals rests on the belief that
ordination requires some level of education or training. Many clergy, though
not all,'58 have formal or informal training in seminary or divinity school;
however, some denominations require no such training or education. "' "To
be a legal minister," a person need only "be ordained by a local church that is
151. Hester v. Barnett, 723 S.W.2d 544, 553 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
152. Fenton, supra note 101, at 55-56.
153. Arnold, supra note 9, at 47.
154. This definition was developed from previous definitions by judges and scholars.
155. Bergman, supra note 134, at 45.
156. WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD COLLEGE DICIONARY 273 (4th ed. 2000).
157. BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 1226 (7th ed. 1999).
158. Some clergy may become ordained through less strict educational requirements, such
as through online registration. See, e.g., Universal Ministries, at http://www.universalministries.
corn (last visited Jan. 21, 2004).
159. GAYLOR, supra note 3, at 24.
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recognized by the state."' 60 Even without formalized training, clergy must be
familiar with church doctrine and policy in addition to religious interpretation.
With a certain degree of specialization necessary for each denomination, most
clergy meet the standard of a professional by acquiring a base level of
knowledge in religion or theology. Education alone does not establish the
cleric as a professional, but combined with knowledge obtained through
service, the cleric satisfies the standard of professional learnedness.'61 If
clergy meet the professional requirement discussed above, the clergy must be
held to a standard of care' 62 for malpractice to apply. The standard in
determining negligence is that of a "reasonable man under like
circumstances."' 63  A standard of care is necessary to establish clergy
malpractice because any application of the tort requires a breach of the
accepted standard of care."6 Additionally, the standard of care is essential for
presenting sufficient evidence for a judge or jury to determine whether there
is an actionable deviation from that standard.'65 The standard of care cannot
violate First Amendment protections; otherwise, the clergy malpractice tort
will fail before it is ever applied. Scholars recommend four purely academic
standards of care in the development of clergy malpractice: (1) "secular
standard," (2) "state of the art standard," (3) "denominationally specific
standard," and (4) "neutral standard of care."' 66
160. Id.
161. Therefore, a cleric from a religious denomination that does not require extensive
training or education may still satisfy the standard of professional learnedness through acquired
knowledge. That knowledge may be obtained on the job or from being mentored by other
clergy.
162. "Standard of care" is defined as "the degree of care that a reasonable person should
exercise." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1413 (7th ed. 1999).
163. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 283 (1965).
164. The standard of care applies in two types of situations: counseling and mentoring.
Counseling occurs in a structured environment and consists of advising a parishioner regarding
"educational and occupational alternatives, personal problems, etc." WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD
COLLEGE DICTIONARY 331 (4th ed. 2000). Mentoring occurs in a more nonstructured
relationship. Mentoring is not a particular activity but consists of a pattern of interactions
between a priest and parishioner. This type of relationship could develop a greater amount of
trust because of the continuing nature of the relationship.
165. Constance Frisby Fain, Clergy Malpractice: Liability for Negligent Counseling and
Sexual Misconduct, 12 Miss. C. L. REv. 97, 97-98 (1991).
166. Margaret Ann Burton, Comment, Nally v. Grace Community Church: Is There a Future




1. The Secular Standard
The secular standard separates pastoral counseling from the religious
function of the cleric, 67 analogizing pastoral counseling to psychiatric or
psychological counseling. 168 The standard emphasizes the skill, expertise,
care, and diligence in taking care of responsibilities to a patient or
parishioner. 69 Essentially, the secular standard finds religion as only an
incidental part of the counseling relationship and does not allow it to interfere
with the standard of care.
Legal scholars greatly criticize the secular standard because of the
inconsistencies in training and treatment methods between a cleric-counselor
and a conventional counselor 7° Oftentimes, a cleric-counselor's training
occurs in his education to become a minister, rather than through education to
become a counselor.'' Additionally, because the cleric-counselor's advice
often rests on theology, imposing the mental health professional standard of
care may be unreasonable.'
2. The State-of-the-Art Standard
The purpose behind holding clergy to the same standards as their secular
counterparts is to force clergy to learn at least current elementary
psychological knowledge.'73 The state-of-the-art standard heavily burdens
clerics because it requires a cleric to be familiar with the most state-of-the-art
counseling procedures, principles, and trends.'74 The standard evolves with
the changing principles of psychotherapy and counseling.' Moreover, the
continuing education requirement places a heavy burden on a cleric to remain
abreast of the current principles and methods of counseling. 17 6 If a cleric fails
to meet that demanding standard, he may be held liable for malpractice.
Proponents of the state-of-the-art standard argue that religious conscience
should compel the clergy to acquire greater competence and responsibility to
better serve their parishioners.' The standard would then not hinder the
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Fain, supra note 165, at 101-02.
170. Id. at 102.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Bergman, supra note 134, at 58.
174. Burton, supra note 166, at 472.
175. Fain, supra note 165, at 102.
176. ld.
177. Bergman, supra note 134, at 58.
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clergy's ability to counsel and assist his congregants, but instead would
enhance his ability by giving his congregants a greater sense of security in the
cleric's competence, knowledge, and sincerity. 78 However, critics disapprove
of the state-of-the-art standard because of the heavy burden it places upon
clerics to maintain their knowledge and stay abreast to developments in
counseling. 79 Also, psychiatric or psychological developments might
contradict the cleric's theological philosophy.' 8° Thus, forcing a cleric to
adopt views contrary to his religion's philosophy would inhibit the free
exercise of religion and hinder the cleric's counseling function.
3. The Denominationally Specific Standard
The denominationally specific standard developed from a general
comparison of one cleric's conduct with that of other clerics in the community
who represent similar religious philosophies. 8' This standard allows for
comparison to other clergy in the same denomination and also accounts for the
scope of training in the community. Is2  Commentators criticize the
denominationally specific standard most forcefully because they fear that this
standard would require courts to analyze and assess church doctrine, which
would offend the First Amendment. 8 3 Indeed, the problems far outweigh the
benefits of this standard because courts must scrutinize and assess a cleric's
religious doctrine and compare that with other similar religions.8 4 The only
way to avoid the entanglement issue inherent in assessing religious doctrine
would be to look only to secular documents in the church, such as the Roman
Catholic Church's Charter 8 5 and Norms, 186 which establish nonreligious
policies to manage sexual misconduct within the Catholic Church.
4. The Neutral Standard of Care
The final standard of care is the neutral standard, which consists of a
threshold test to determine whether to impose the standard of care, followed
by a three-prong test to determine whether a violation occurred.8 7 The neutral
standard of care, as espoused by legal theorists, applies only to a cleric-
178. Id.
179. Fain, supra note 165, at 102-03.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 103.
182. Burton, supra note 166, at 472-73.
183. Fain, supra note 165, at 103.
184. Id.
185. CHARTER, supra note 39.
186. Catholic Bishops, Norms, supra note 56.




parishioner counseling relationship.'s The threshold test has two parts. First,
the test analyzes whether the religious counseling intends to move towards an
identifiable goal recognized by both the cleric and the parishioner.8 9 Second,
the test analyzes how both parties perceive the relationship. 90 The two-part
threshold test establishes both an objective and subjective criteria of the
cleric-parishioner relationship before establishing whether malpractice
occurred. 9'
If the threshold test is met, the relationship must satisfy three subsequent
prongs. The first prong requires testing and diagnosis. 9 2 The testing phase
of the counseling relationship forces a cleric to understand a parishioner's
emotional and psychological problems. 93 The second prong requires a
"referral to a qualified professional."' 94 If the cleric finds, after testing, that
the parishioner's emotional or psychological problems exceed his expertise,
the cleric must refer the parishioner to a qualified professional. 9' The third
prong requires training. 196  Training forces the cleric to have minimal
diagnostic skills.' 97 A cleric must meet all three prongs to be held to the
neutral professional standard of care in a counseling relationship. Although
this standard is objective, its scope is too narrow because it only addresses the
counseling relationship and fails to cover all of the areas in which misconduct
occurs in the clergy-parishioner relationship.
D. Defining a Standard of Care by Looking Beyond the Religious Beliefs
Clergy malpractice requires developing a standard of care that does not
infringe on religious rights but that also establishes a clear boundary for
breach.'98 This comment sets forth and discusses four possible standards of
care - secular standard, state of the art standard, denominationally specific
standard, and neutral standard. These standards are purely academic, as courts
have not endorsed any one theory of standard of care because most believe
that defining any standard of care would violate the First Amendment.'99 For










198. Scott C. Idleman, Tort Liability, Religious Entities, and the Decline of Constitutional
Protection, 75 IND. L.J. 219, 233 (2000).
199. Enderle v. Trautman, No. CIV. 13-01-22, 2001 WL 1820145 (D.N.D. Dec. 3, 2001).
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example, in F.G. v. MacDonell,2" the New Jersey Supreme Court addressed
the question of whether an appropriate standard of care could be determined.
The court stated that the most difficult hurdle in establishing the clergy
malpractice tort is defining a relevant standard of care without infringing upon
the First Amendment.2"' The court reasoned that "[diefining that standard
could embroil courts in establishing the training, skill, and standards
applicable for members of the clergy in a diversity of religions with widely
varying beliefs."2"2 The secular standard of care avoids the First Amendment
problem. In applying the secular standard of care, courts could separate the
counseling function of the cleric's conduct from the religious function. Even
though religion pervades the counseling process, the actual act of counseling
or the conduct in the relationship establishes a duty to exercise the degree of
care and skill unique to practitioners of divinity. The duty to exercise a
reasonable degree of care may be derived from a secular document that
outlines the proper procedure in a counseling situation or when speaking and
interacting with children and young people. Moreover, the definition of
clergy malpractice proposed in this comment requires "a breach of fiduciary
duty unique to practitioners of divinity." This standard takes into account the
presence of religion but does not accept it as the most important determinant.
To remove religion entirely from any standard of care definition would be
impossible because it explains the presence of the counseling or mentoring
relationship. Without religion, parishioners would not seek out their clergy
for guidance. Religion is the foundation of the cleric-congregant relationship,
but the interactions can be separated by focusing on the type of relationship
itself instead of the religion surrounding it. Assessing a standard of care in
this manner distinguishes between religion and counseling. For example, the
duty and subsequent breach may be derived by compliance with a secular
document, such as those created by the Roman Catholic Church. If a cleric
violates the secular document by improperly interacting with a child, the
breach would be related to the secular document, not the religious belief.
Also, if a cleric fails to meet the requirements set forth in the policy regarding
how to handle cases of clergy sexual misconduct by either ignoring the
incidents or by covering them up, the cleric would have breached the wholly
secular policy regarding these actions. The focus on such a document
removes concerns about religious infringement.
Since the scandal in the Roman Catholic Church has become increasingly
prevalent, separating religion from the standard of care has become easier.
200. 696 A.2d 697 (N.J. 1997).
201. Id. at 703.
202. Id. Note also that this same concern has kept courts from accepting claims for breach




Religious institutions have adopted secular policy documents that detail the
standard of care necessary for their clergy.2°3 For example, the Roman
Catholic Church's Charter and Norms provide the proper standard when
dealing with children and consequently establish the punishment for failing
to meet that standard.2 4 Priests and deacons can be held to the standard set
forth in the Charter and the Norms without entangling courts in interpreting
religious doctrine. Moreover, bishops can be held to an equally secular
standard of care. As the overseeing body of both the Charter and the Norms,
courts could hold bishops liable for clergy malpractice if they fail to enforce
the document in their dioceses. By eliminating church doctrine, or canon law,
the Charter and the Norms present a wholly secular document with a definable
standard.
Courts readily admit that sexual misconduct does not fall within the scope
of religious duties and that no problem in understanding the standard of care
occurs because "reasonably prudent clergy of any sect do not molest
children. 20 5 Even while admitting that fact, courts still refuse to allow for the
tort of clergy malpractice because they fear that such a tort places the courts
on a "slippery slope."2 "6 Courts acknowledge that the difficulty in determining
the standard of care does not arise in a case involving sexual abuse of a minor,
but instead surfaces in a case involving disapproval in a sermon or in
subsequent cases of misconduct.20 7 By applying a clear definition and precise
standard of care, courts can avoid the slippery slope. Although clergy
malpractice may open the door to more litigation against churches and their
clergy, it will allow greater recovery for the traumas suffered by the victims
of sexual misconduct and exploitation.
The First Amendment does not require judicial deference when doctrinal
controversy is not involved, and in cases of sexual misconduct, no such
doctrinal imposition exists.20 8 In sexual misconduct cases, creating a standard
of care that does not violate the tenets of any religious denomination is
possible. By giving no greater deference to tortious conduct committed by
religious actors or institutions than nonreligious actors or institutions, courts
avoid problems of entanglement.20 9 If courts hold all nonlicensed counselors
to the same standard of care, the fact that the counselor is also a cleric does
not bear any additional weight. A law that establishes standards of conduct
203. See supra notes 39, 56 and accompanying text.
204. Catholic Bishops, Nonns, supra note 56.
205. Schmidt v. Bishop, 779 F. Supp. 321, 328 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Amato v. Greenquist, 679 N.E.2d 446,451-52 (111. Ct. App. 1997).
209. Malicki v. Doe, 814 So. 2d 347, 360 (Fla. 2002).
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"does not implicate the Free Exercise Clause unless adherence to those
standards interferes with religious belief or activity.' '2 0 Thus, holding both
nonclerics and clerics to the same standard of care in a counseling relationship
or when interacting with children would not interfere with religious activity
or belief. Instead, the standard of care for both gives no greater or lesser
deference to religious organizations than to nonreligious entities. 21 1
E. Further Criticisms of the Tort of Clergy Malpractice
The initial hurdle in defining the tort of clergy malpractice is defining
which standard of care to apply; however, accepting the tort of clergy
malpractice has three additional criticisms: (1) incorporating clergy
malpractice would require judicial activism; (2) the clergy malpractice cause
of action is a redundant remedy; and (3) clergy malpractice violates the
fundamental value of the First Amendment by infringing on religious freedom.
The following discussion illustrates the merits and flaws of each criticism.
1. Incorporating the Tort of Clergy Malpractice Would Require Judicial
Activism
Courts addressing the tort of clergy malpractice frequently state that no
other jurisdiction has allowed the tort claim to stand. These sentiments
confirm the fears surrounding judicial activism. The court in Borchers v.
Hrychuk,2 2 for example, submitted to concerns about judicial activism when
it examined the application of clergy malpractice to a sexual relationship that
developed during a counseling relationship between a Seventh-day Adventist
minister and a parishioner. The court did not scrutinize the merits of applying
clergy malpractice but instead refused to accept the tort based on its
adjudicatory role, stating,
As the state's intermediate appellate court, our primary function is
to correct error, and not to pronounce new substantive legal rules.
Further, when we do pronounce such rules, it is important that our
pronouncements have at least some basis in either previous rulings
of the Court of Appeals or statute. Neither the Court of Appeals
nor the General Assembly have ever indicated that they would
recognize the tort of clergy malpractice; and in the absence of such




212. 727 A.2d 388 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1999).




Although adopting the tort of clergy malpractice appears to take judicial
activism, the tort has well-established roots in modem tort law.214  The
malpractice duty of care is the general requirement to exercise the skill and
knowledge of members of a particular profession. I5 Malpractice applies to
211 28 219many professions,216 including physicians,"' attorneys, " engineers,
accountants, 220 dentists,22' pharmacists, 22 2 and psychiatrists.2 23 Additionally,
creative attorneys increasingly employ educational malpractice,224 consultant
malpractice,225 and computer malpractice 226 in current litigation. Each
application requires a professional be held to a certain standard determined by
the courts or the legislature. 227 A malpractice standard serves to raise the
competence level within a profession and to protect those who interact with
the profession.228 With a defined standard of care, such as a standard based
upon the secular policies of the church, a court could extend malpractice to
clergy without excessively entangling itself in questions of religious freedom.
Basing the malpractice definition on a secular standard, rather than forcing
courts to evaluate each religion's belief system would establish a unified
standard without radical judicial activism.
2. The Clergy Malpractice Cause of Action is a Redundant Remedy
Legal scholars and courts alike believe the tort of clergy malpractice
overlaps with the existing intentional torts, such as battery, negligent or
intentional infliction of emotional distress, breach of fiduciary duty, or
214. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 299A cmt. b (1965).
215. Id. § 299A.
216. Id. § 299A cmt. b.
217. See Nowatske v. Osterloh, 549 N.W.2d 256 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996).
218. See McCullough v. Sullivan, 132 A. 102 (N.J. Ct. Err. & App. 1926).
219. See Cowles v. City of Minneapolis, 151 N.W. 184 (Minn. 1915).
220. See L.B. Lab., Inc. v. Mitchell, 244 P.2d 385 (Cal. 1952).
221. See United Dentists v. Bryan, 164 S.E. 554 (Va. 1932).
222. See Allan v. State S.S. Co, 30 N.E. 482 (N.Y. 1892).
223. See Hammer v. Rosen, 165 N.E.2d 756 (N.Y. 1960).
224. See Peter W. v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., 131 Cal. Rptr. 854 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976).
225. See Hosp. Computer Sys., Inc. v. Staten Island Hosp., 788 F. Supp. 1351 (D.N.J. 1992).
See generally Richard A. Glaser & Leslee M. Lewis, Redefining the Professional: The Policies
and Unregulated Development of Consultant Malpractice Liability, 72 U. DET. MERCY L. REV.
563 (1995).
226. See Invacare Corp. v. Sperry Corp., 612 F. Supp 448 (N.D. Ohio 1984). See generally
Sue Ganske Graziano, Computer Malpractice - A New Tort on the Horizon?, 17 RUTGERS
COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 177 (1991).
227. Julie Johnson, Comment, The Sanctuary Crumbles: The Future of Clergy Malpractice
in Michigan, 74 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 493, 510-11 (1997).
228. Fenton, supra note 101, at 57.
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negligent hiring and supervision.2 9 In Hester v. Barnett,230 the plaintiffs asked
the court to apply the tort of clergy malpractice to a Baptist minister who
divulged confidential information regarding a family's counseling sessions.
However, the court rejected clergy malpractice because of the potential for a
redundant remedy. 23' The court stated, 'To avoid a redundant remedy.., any
functional theory of clergy malpractice needs [to] address incidents of the
clergy-communicant relationship not already actionable. 232 Additionally, the
court noted that the intentional torts of clergy are already actionable without
clashing with the Free Exercise clause of the First Amendment.233
The Ohio Supreme Court embraced the Hester court's refusal
to"creative[ly] use. . . tort law" by granting a redundant remedy. 234 In Strock
v. Pressnell,235 a case involving a husband's complaint for clergy malpractice
that resulted from an affair between his wife and a Lutheran minister during
marriage counseling, the Ohio Supreme Court held that the tort of clergy
malpractice applied only if the alleged conduct falls "outside the scope of
other recognized torts." '236 Consequently, the court dismissed the clergy
malpractice cause of action because the alleged acts were actionable through
the realm of intentional tort law.237 Again, in Byrd v. Faber,238 a case
involving nonconsensual sex between a pastor and a parishioner's wife, the
Ohio Supreme Court dismissed a claim of clergy malpractice and stated,
"To . . . allow recovery for clergy malpractice on the basis of this same
conduct would be to grant a redundant remedy" 239 because the complaint
failed to articulate any conduct that was not already actionable through
existing tort law.24°
The problem with overlap is not as simple as either the Ohio or Missouri
courts believe. The current torts available for clergy sexual misconduct are
not widely accepted by all jurisdictions. Courts have failed to reach a
consensus on which torts most adequately provide the victim with a remedy.24'
229. See Hester v. Barnett, 723 S.W.2d 544 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987); Byrd v. Raber, 565 N.E.2d
584 (Ohio 1991).
230. 723 S.W.2d 544 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
231. Id. at551.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 552.
234. Byrd, 565 N.E.2d at 587.
235. 527 N.E.2d 1235 (Ohio 1988).
236. Id. at 1239.
237. Id.
238. 565 N.E.2d 584 (Ohio 1991).
239. Id. at 587.
240. Id.




A court accepting one intentional tort, such as intentional infliction of
emotional distress, may choose not to accept another cause of action, leaving
the victim with little consistency when preparing for litigation. Moreover,
courts reluctantly involve themselves in religious conflicts, a concern most
often stated when refusing to accept the tort of clergy malpractice. Therefore,
the tort of clergy malpractice would fill a gap in the tort recovery system.
With limited application in each jurisdiction, clergy malpractice would
circumvent the problems of unclear tort law by establishing one acceptable
remedy. Victims would no longer be forced to gamble on which tort a
particular jurisdiction will accept. Instead, clergy malpractice would avoid a
redundant remedy, while offering litigants a clearer means for recovery.
3. Clergy Malpractice Violates the Fundamental Value of the First
Amendment by Infringing on Religious Freedom
The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states, "Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof .... . 242 The First Amendment comprises the Free Exercise Clause,
which protects the ability to exercise one's religious beliefs without
government invasion, and the Establishment Clause, which provides that the
government will not establish or endorse any particular religion. The Free
Exercise Clause "embraces two concepts, - freedom to believe and freedom
to act ' and guarantees, "first and foremost, the right to believe and profess
whatever religious doctrine one desires." 2" Importantly, the freedom to
believe is absolute, but the freedom to act cannot be absolute because
"[c]onduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of society. 245
The test used by courts to determine whether an activity violates the First
Amendment's Establishment Clause is the Lemon test, derived from Lemon
v. Kurtzman.24 6 The Lemon test is a three-pronged test. The first prong asks
whether the statute or activity that allegedly infringes a religious belief or
activity has a secular purpose.247 The second prong asks whether the statute
or activity's primary effect "neither advances nor inhibits religion. '24' Finally,
the third prong asks whether the statute or activity promotes "'an excessive
242. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
243. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
244. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990).
245. Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 303-04.
246. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
247. Id. at 612.
248. Id.
2004]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2004
OKLAHOMA LAWREVIEW
government entanglement with religion."'249 Courts and legal scholars often
criticize the Lemon test, and most courts now focus on the third prong alone. z0
Courts' criticisms of clergy malpractice involve the third prong of the
Lemon test because many believe that determining a reasonable standard of
care or examining the hiring, retention, or supervision processes within a
religious organization would excessively entangle the courts in religion.25'
Most courts that refuse to accept clergy malpractice because of First
Amendment concerns state that "judicial review of pastoral counseling 'would
require the [c]ourt and the jury to consider the fundamental perspective and
approach to counseling inherent in the beliefs and practices' of the religious
denomination[s]. 252 Also, many courts maintain that any inquiry into the
decision of who should become a cleric or remain one would involve religious
doctrine and therefore excessively entangle courts in decisions of religious
doctrine or policy.253
Courts cannot assess the choices within the religious denomination, but
clergy malpractice does not require such an in-depth inquiry.254 An inquiry
based on clergy malpractice would likely not violate the First Amendment if
the questions surround a secular document or separate themselves from the
religious doctrine. The Florida Supreme Court nearly accepted a clergy
malpractice claim in its analysis in Malicki v. Doe. In Malicki, the court
249. Id. at 613 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
250. Justice Scalia colorfully analogized the Lemon test, stating, "Like some ghoul in a late-
night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly
killed and buried, Lemon stalks our Establishment Clause jurisprudence once again ...."
Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
concurring). For a discussion about the development of the Lemon Test, see Heather S. Savage,
Note, The School Voucher Debate: Recasting the Third Prong of the Lemon Test, 45 HOw. L.J.
465, 472-83 (2002). For the principal criticisms of the Lemon test, see KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN
& GERALD GUNTHER, FIRST AMENDMENT LAW 535 (2d ed. 2003).
251. Leary v. Geoghan, No. 990371, 2000 WL 1473579, at *1 (Mass. Super. Ct. June 28,
2000).
252. Lann v. Davis, 34,892 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/22/01), 793 So. 2d 463,465 (quoting Schmidt
v. Bishop, 779 F. Supp. 321, 328 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)).
253. Isely v. Capuchin Province, 880 F. Supp. 1138,1150 (E.D. Mich. 1995); see also Lann,
34,892 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/22/01), 793 So. 2d at 465 (stating that judicial review of pastoral
counseling would violate the separation of church and state); Gibson v. Brewer, 952 S.W.2d
239,247 (Mo. 199 1) (stating "judicial inquiry into hiring, ordaining, and retaining clergy would
result in an endorsement of religion, by approving one model of church hiring, ordination, and
retention of clergy"); Langford v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 705 N.Y.S.2d 661,662 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2000) (stating that "any attempt to define the duty of care owed by a member of the clergy
to a parishioner fosters excessive entanglement with religion").
254. See Marci Hamilton, The Catholic Church, the Insurance Carriers, and Why the First
Amendment's Religious Freedom Guarantees Provide No Defense in the Clergy Abuse Cases,




examined negligent hiring and supervision claims resulting from a priest's
sexual molestation and assault.255 The Florida Supreme Court held that the
First Amendment "does not provide a shield behind which a church may avoid
liability for harm caused to an adult and a child parishioner arising from the
alleged sexual assault or battery by one of its clergy. 256 In holding that the
church could not escape liability, the court stated, "'[J]ust as the State may
prevent a church from offering human sacrifices, it may protect its children
against injuries caused by pedophiles by authorizing civil damages against a
church that knowingly... creates a situation in which such injuries are likely
to occur. "257 The court, understanding the gravity of sexual misconduct and
abuse, held that the First Amendment could not insulate churches from
liability.
Religious institutions attempt to shield themselves from liability by hiding
behind the First Amendment argument that the tort of clergy malpractice
would violate the separation of church and state.258 However, courts can avoid
the potential religious entanglement by following Malicki or by applying one
of three other options for analysis.
First, a court may apply the "neutral principles method, which allows the
adjudication of religious institutional disputes" when neutral principles of law
can resolve the argument.259 That is, courts can apply legal standards or rules
that are regularly applied without regard to the fact that the case involves a
particular religious institution or doctrine. 26" The neutral principles method
most often applies in property disputes involving religious institutions.261
According to the U.S. Supreme Court, the neutral principles method "relies
exclusively on objective, well-established concepts of ... law familiar to
lawyers and judges [and] promises to free civil courts completely from
entanglement in questions of religious doctrine, polity, and practice. 262 The
Supreme Court initially approved the neutral principles method for
intrachurch property disputes; 26' however, lower courts have extended the
application to tort actions against religious institutions.2' The First
255. Malicki v. Doe, 814 So. 2d 347, 352 (Fla. 2002).
256. Id. at 351.
257. Id. at 360 (quoting Doe v. Dorsey, 683 So. 2d 614, 617 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)).
258. Lann, 34,892 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/22/01), 793 So.2d at 465 (stating that judicial review
of pastoral counseling would cause inquiry into religious fundamentals and violate the First
Amendment's separation of church and state).
259. Idleman, supra note 198, at 259.
260. Id.
261. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979).
262. Id. at 603.
263. See id. at 604.
264. See Martinelli v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 10 F. Supp. 2d 138, 148
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Amendment defense becomes "frivolous"2 65 when courts can resolve disputes
with neutral principles of tort law.
Second, courts can deem the question or conduct nonreligious, avoiding the
First Amendment problem altogether.266  By defining the inquiry as
nonreligious, courts take the matter out of the First Amendment realm and
eliminate the subsequent entanglement of church and state.2 67 The Missouri
Court of Appeals followed this approach, stating, "Tort actions against
religious groups or persons are not offensive to the First Amendment if based
on purely secular activities, unrelated to their religious functions .... 99268 The
court allowed the cause of action "if the alleged wrongdoing was clearly
outside the tenets of the religion, notwithstanding its religious pretext.
269
However, both this approach and the neutral principles method involve a
"substantial risk that judges will erroneously recategorize matters as
nonreligious simply to subject them to adjudication.""27  The risk of
recategorization appears in circumstances where the alleged wrongdoing may
seem clearly beyond the tenets of the religion, but a determination of whether
the conduct accords with the religion can involve "judicial interpretation of
religious doctrine."
271
Finally, courts can admit that the conduct or counseling is religious but
determine that the religious nature is inconsequential and therefore not
excessive nor impermissible for First Amendment purposes.272 The New
Jersey Supreme Court applied this approach in a breach of contract cause of
action, stating, "Just as the existence of a tangential secular issue does not
authorize civil courts to override primarily doctrinal determinations by
authorities in hierarchical religions, inconsequential doctrinal issues that were
irrelevant to the employment relationship do not preclude doctrinally-
objective enforcement of a secular interest pursuant to a secular agreement."
273
(D. Conn. 1998) (holding that a breach of fiduciary duty claim "was capable of being resolved
under Connecticut law using neutral principles"); Smith v. O'Connell, 986 F. Supp. 73 (D.R.I.
1997) (applying the neutral principles method); Isely v. Capuchin Province, 880 F. Supp. 1138
(E.D. Mich. 1995) (applying neutral principles method to negligent supervision).
265. Strock v. Pressnell, 527 N.E.2d 1235, 1239 (Ohio 1988).
266. Idleman, supra note 198, at 261.
267. Id.
268. H.R.B. v. J.L.G., 913 S.W.2d 92, 98 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995).
269. Id.
270. Idleman, supra note 198, at 262.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 264.




Again, there still exists the concern that judges must determine what amount
of religion is inconsequential or minor.274
Courts may also create exceptions to avoid adjudicatory entanglement with
religion, thereby obscuring any emphasis on religion." 5 There are at least
three exceptions that may apply. First, some courts distinguish between
"conduct affecting persons sufficiently affiliated with the religious institution
and conduct affecting third parties., 276 This distinction allows courts to hold
that a church has no power to regulate or adjudicate conduct involving third
parties.277 Second, some courts draw lines "between conduct that occurs
within the spatial bounds or authoritative domain of the religious institution
and conduct that occurs outside of those parameters. '27" The attempt to
separate the religious and the secular based on where an alleged wrongdoing
occurred could remove First Amendment concerns and allow the court to
accept the cause of action.279 Third, some courts have found that prohibition
based on the First Amendment is inapplicable in intentional tort cases. 80 The
purpose behind such a holding remains that clergy and churches cannot be
insulated from liability for their own intentional wrongdoings."' These
exceptions remove any First Amendment boundaries and strengthen the
availability of existing remedies in the religious context.
274. Idleman, supra note 198, at 264.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 264-65.
277. See Konkle v. Henson, 672 N.E.2d 450, 455 n.6 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) ("The limits on
the court's power are confined to intra-church disputes."); Hadnot v. Shaw, 1992 OK 21, 30,
826 P.2d 978, 988 (barring judicial scrutiny into ecclesiastical jurisdiction but not extending
the bar to nonmembers because "the church has no power over those who live outside of the
spiritual community").
278. Idleman, supra note 198, at 265.
279. See Hayden v. Schulte, 97-0422 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/29/97), 701 So. 2d 1354, 1356
(allowing a defamation action against a church because the defamatory statements were
"intentionally disseminated outside the church to news organizations"); Schoenhals v. Mains,
504 N.W.2d 233, 236 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (in a defamation action, the court stated, "[W]e
believe that the fact that the letter was disseminated only to other members of the Church
strengthens the conclusion that [the] statements involved and were limited to Church
discipline.").
280. Idleman, supra note 198, at 265-66.
281. See Hester v. Barnett, 723 S.W.2d 544, 552 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (finding intentional
torts by a cleric are actionable, even though they are "incidents of religious practice and belief");
F.G. v. MacDonell, 696 A.2d 697, 702 (N.J. 1997) (recognizing intentional torts against the
clergy and listing other courts who have allowed intentional torts against the clergy).
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V. Changing the Court's Mind: Accepting and Applying the Tort of Clergy
Malpractice
As discussed in Part IV, clergy malpractice consists of five elements
necessary to establish this tort: (1) failure to exercise the degree of care and
skill unique to practitioners of divinity (2) in a parishioner's relationship
based on counseling or conduct (3) by outrageous conduct that (4) causes a
definable injury to the parishioner (5) who relied upon the cleric's advice,
conduct, or counseling.282 For courts to accept the tort of clergy malpractice,
there must be a clear definition with a precise application. The above
definition provides that precision to allow for application in appropriate
contexts.
A. Accepting the New Tort of Clergy Malpractice
The narrow construction of clergy malpractice sets forth an actionable tort,
but courts must also accept the new application as a positive expansion of tort
liability. For legal change to occur in the area of clergy malpractice, an
internal or external stimulus, such as "the institution of litigation, a proposal
of legislation, a shift in public attitudes, pressure from the media, the lobbying
of a cause, and the like," must engage the legal or political processes.283 These
stimuli are the cultural factors that effectuate change in society.2 4 Three
factors weigh in favor of accepting the tort of clergy malpractice as beneficial
to society: (1) the shift in public attitudes demonstrates the need for change
in the accountability of religious institutions and clergy; (2) increasing
litigation stimulates change and evolution in tort law and reveals the need for
clergy malpractice; and (3) the media and lobbying groups pressure the courts
for answers.
1. The Shift in Public Attitudes Demonstrates the Need for
Accountability of Religious Institutions and the Promotion of Safety in
the Church
Public sympathy for victims of clergy abuse and related opposition toward
clergy who commit such acts will influence courts to adopt the tort of clergy
malpractice. Increasingly, the public is more sympathetic to victims and more
antipathetic toward offending clergy and churches that cover up such
wrongs. 285 The violation of trust and confidence occurring in religious
282. See supra Part N.B.
283. Idleman, supra note 198, at 240.
284. Id.




institutions contravenes the general goals of safety and protection. Safety is
of the utmost importance in society, which favors protecting innocent children
who have been abused over predatory clergy who prey on those innocent
children. 86
The Boston Globe and Boston's WBZ-TV conducted a survey of 800
Catholics in the Boston Diocese. Thirty-one percent of the polled Catholics
said that the sex abuse scandal had caused them to donate less money to the
church than prior to the break of the priest sexual abuse scandal.287 Sixty-four
percent of the participants believed that the Catholic Church cared more about
protecting the priests than the people who were sexually abused by the
priests.288 Finally, 81% of the Catholics polled believed that the Church had
tried to cover up cases of sexual abuse of children by priests.289 These
statistics clearly show that Catholics are skeptical of the Church's ability to
assist victims and believe that the Church is more concerned with the priests
and its own image than the safety and well-being of the children and the
parishioners.
Today's society has a heightened awareness of victim status, and the public
believes that the Church should not mistreat victims.2 90 Sympathy towards
victims could lead to greater assistance and better remedies for recovery by
pressuring the judiciary and the legislature to implement better recovery
methods. By allowing claims of clergy malpractice to stand, courts would
serve public policy and promote the safety of children over the harboring of
criminals. Clergy malpractice simply gives innocent victims recourse for their
wrongs.29l
2. Increasing Litigation Stimulates Change and Evolution in Tort Law
and Reveals the Need for the Tort of Clergy Malpractice
One of the most obvious stimuli motivating change in tort law and
promoting the acceptance of clergy malpractice is the increase in civil
litigation. Approximately fifteen years ago, a case involving pastoral
286. Wood, supra note 77, at 1050.
287. Michael Paulson, Most Catholics in Poll Want a Resignation, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 17,




290. Idleman, supra note 198, at 243.
291. Oftentimes clergy offenders are not punished in the criminal justice system because of
statute of limitations problems or failure of the victims to come forward quickly, leaving the
civil remedy as the only option for justice. See O'Reilly & Strasser, supra note 20, at 68-69
(discussing the effect of statutes of limitations and other statutes on liability in clergy sexual
misconduct cases).
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counselors failing to refer a parishioner for additional treatment introduced the
tort of clergy malpractice.292 Since then, tort actions for clergy impropriety
appear to be on the rise.293 This increase alone is significant because it shows
both an increased willingness to charge religious institutions and a desire to
change the face of tort law.
Additionally, increased litigation will encourage courts to accept clergy
malpractice as a tort for two reasons. First, increased litigation places the
claims for liability and unreasonableness of conduct before the legal system
for some determination as to their merit, either by judges or by juries.294
Second, a victim's willingness to bring suit against his clergy and church may
prompt other victims to bring suit.295 With a greater willingness to test the
system and seek recovery, victims frequently will litigate their claims and
pressure courts to develop new theories of recovery.
Increased litigation offers the judicial community multiple opportunities to
examine the propriety of clergy malpractice. Already courts are separating the
religious context from the conduct in other torts such as negligent hiring and
supervision and accepting theories of liability against churches and clerics.
296
The more courts review clergy malpractice, the more likely they will also
accept the clergy malpractice standard.
3. The Media and Lobbying Groups Pressure Courts for Answers
Clergy impropriety, sexual misconduct, and sexual abuse received a rash
of media coverage across the nation.297 Accounts of clergy misconduct are no
longer hidden in the religion section of major newspapers; these accounts fall
squarely on the front pages of the nation's leading newspapers. The Boston
Globe alone published more than 600 articles and opinion pieces from January
2002 to September 2002 dealing with clergy misconduct.
298
Increased media pressure may have two effects on the imposition of clergy
malpractice in modern tort law.299 First, the media may spur potential
292. Nally v. Grace Cmty. Church of the Valley, 763 P.2d 948 (Cal. 1988).
293. Idleman, supra note 198, at 240; see also MCMENAMIN, supra note 115, at 5 ("There
is an epidemic of clergy malpractice claims."); Arnold, supra note 9, at 26 (noting an outpouring
or "epidemic" of claims against the church and clergy).
294. Idleman, supra note 198, at 241-42.
295. Id. at 242.
296. Malicki v. Doe, 814 So. 2d 347, 360 (Fla. 2002).
297. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
298. Boston Globe, The Boston Globe Spotlight on Abuse in the Catholic Church, at
http://www.boston.com/globe/spotlight/abuse (last visited July 15, 2004).
299. Additionally, media and lobbying pressure could result in legislation. For example,
Minnesota has extended counseling liability to clergy. MINN. STAT. § 148B.60 (1998). In




plaintiffs to file suit against the clergy and churches,3"° which will lead to
increased litigation and its benefits."' Second, increased media coverage may
"'put pressure on the courts and the churches to do what is necessary to alter
pastoral conduct. "302 This media pressure can either be a direct influence on
judges and juries trying cases involving clergy impropriety or an indirect
influence on public attitude, which will, in turn, affect judicial decision
making.30 3 Either type of influence will greatly increase the acceptance of
clergy malpractice as the media and the people choose to promote the tort of
clergy malpractice.
B. Applying the Tort of Clergy Malpractice to Cardinal Bernard Law
To understand the application of the tort of clergy malpractice, consider the
following facts about Cardinal Bernard Law's response to clergy sexual
"unlicensed mental heath practitioner" to include "clergy who are providing mental health
services that are equivalent to those defined [in the previous section of the statute]." Id.
§ 148B.60(3)(3). The statute exempts clergy who are simply providing "pastoral services" in
the context of their vocation. Id. § 148B.60(4).
The Supreme Court of Minnesota reviewed the statute in its application to a parishioner who
alleged that a minister "engaged in improprieties in counseling" the parishioner's wife.
Odenthal v. Minn. Conference of Seventh-day Adventists, 649 N.W.2d 426,430 (Minn. 2002).
The court held that the statute's application to clergy did not "'alter or impinge upon the
religious character' of the relationship." Id. at 441 (quoting Hill-Murray Fed'n of Teachers v.
Hill-Murray High Sch., 487 N.W.2d 857, 864 (Minn. 1992)). Additionally, the court held that
the statute still allowed for spiritual counseling and guidance regarding doctrinal teachings
without concern for malpractice claims. Id. Therefore, the statute provides a standard of
acceptable conduct for all mental health professionals that allows for the inclusion of spiritual
or religious aspects and still holds the professional to a degree of care without burdening the
exercise of religion. Id. at 442.
The Minnesota legislature extended a malpractice standard to clergy acting as mental health
professionals. This statute presents a valid step to incorporating clergy malpractice and the
properly applying the tort. Legislation similar to Minnesota's statute that includes clergy
members in the classification of unlicensed mental health professionals is the first step to
legislation that provides for recovery in all counseling and mentoring situations. The statute
must provide a claim for recovery that falls within the definable malpractice standard while still
being easily applicable. Minnesota's statute does this but subsequent statutes should more
precisely define the clergy's role as an unlicensed professional and provide additional
clarification.
300. During the first months of the 2002 breaking scandal in the Boston Archdiocese of the
Catholic Church, more than 200 victims of sexual abuse in the Boston area contacted The
Boston Globe to tell their stories. BETRAYAL, supra note 1, at 80. For many of these victims,
the reporters were the first to hear of the shame and guilt they had lived with for years. Id.
301. Idleman, supra note 198, at 242.
302. Id. (quoting Fain, supra note 165, at 118).
303. Id.
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misconduct within the Boston Archdiocese. °4 Much of the controversy
surrounding Cardinal Law relates to his cover-up of pedophilic priests.
Cardinal Law transferred to the Archdiocese of Boston in March 1984.305
Father John Geoghan was a priest within the Archdiocese while Cardinal Law
oversaw the Boston-area parishes.30 6 Church officials knew about Geoghan's
pedophilia, but shuffled him from parish to parish to avoid public scandal.30 7
Between 1980 and 1990, Geoghan received treatment for his sexual disorder
but continued to receive clean bills of health.30 8 In September 1984, less than
six months into Cardinal Law's tenure as Archbishop, a parishioner in the
Boston Archdiocese wrote Cardinal Law, informing him that Father Geoghan
had molested seven boys in her extended family.0 9 She wrote,
There is a priest at St. Brendan's in Dorchester who has been
known in the past to molest boys. The Cardinal [Medeiros] had
sent father for treatments, and after returning to parish duties he
maintained a low profile for quite a while. Lately, however, he has
been seen in the company of many boys, to the extent to dropping
them off at their homes as late as 9:30 p.m.
310
Cardinal Law's response to the letter was simply stated, without emotion,
"The matter of your concern is being investigated and appropriate pastoral
decisions will be made both for the priest and God's people., 31' After Father
Geoghan received yet another doctor's approval to send him back to the
ministry,312 Cardinal Law sent Geoghan from St. Brendan's in Boston to St.
Julia's in Weston, Massachusetts.313 Upon assignment to St. Julia's, Bishop
John M. D'Arcy wrote Cardinal Law, questioning the assignment because of
Geoghan's "history of homosexual involvement with young boys" and
304. For the purposes of the argument, the facts will be hypothetically applied as if the
Cardinal were acting under the Charter and the Norms. Additionally, the application will only
consider Cardinal Law's response to Father John Geoghan, not the countless other priests under
his watch.
305. Deposition of Cardinal Law at 13, Leary v. Geoghan (Suffolk County Super. Ct. May
8,2002) (No. 99-0371), http://www.boston.com/globe/spotlight/abuse/geoghan/law-deposition
_print.htm.
306. BETRAYAL, supra note 1, at 26.
307. Id. at 23.
308. Id. at 26.
309. Id. at 217.
310. Id. at 31.
311. Id. at217.
312. Id. at 218. Oftentimes, the letters allowing Father Geoghan to return to a parish for full
duties came from Geoghan's family doctor and friend. Id.




suggesting Father Geoghan be limited to weekend work while receiving
therapy." 4 Cardinal Law permitted Father Geoghan to remain at St. Julia's
and during his work there, Geoghan molested many more children.3"5 Despite
continued complaints by parishioners and a physician's concerns about
Geoghan's work with children," 6 Cardinal Law did not remove Father
Geoghan from active parish duties until December 1994, when he placed
Geoghan on administrative leave. 317 Following Geoghan's administrative
leave, Cardinal Law granted Geoghan sick leave and early retirement before
finally dismissing him from the priesthood in February 1998.318
First, to submit a clergy malpractice claim against Cardinal Law, he must
have failed to exercise the degree of care and skill unique to practitioners of
divinity.319 Thus, there must be a degree of care and skill inherent in Cardinal
Law's position. This degree of care and skill can be derived from the secular
aspects of the Roman Catholic Church. As evidenced by the Church's Charter
and the Norms, the Roman Catholic Church has developed standards of
decency in its order.32" The Charter and the Norms do not specifically delve
into canon law or the requirements of a priest but instead focus on the
church's secular response to the situation. By focusing on the secular
document of a religious institution, the standard is set as one for divinity
practitioners. Next, he must have failed to exercise the standard of care
through a breach.32' Such failure comes from directly violating the secular
document, and therefore does not entangle itself into doctrinal interpretation.
For example, a bishop's standard of care would be to uphold and enforce the
Charter and the Norms. When faced with allegations of sexual abuse, the
bishop should apply proper precautionary measures, including removal of the
accused from the sacred ministry, prohibition of residency in a given place,
and prohibition of public participation in certain sacraments. Also, when
314. Id. at 219.
315. Id. at 35. More than thirty claims have been filed against Geoghan for actions during
his time at St. Julia's parish. Id.
316. Id. at 221. Notes from Bishop Robert J. Banks' conversation with Dr. Brennan, one of
Father Geoghan's treating physicians, state that Dr. Brennan was concerned about Father
Geoghan's interactions with children and thought the Archdiocese "better clip his wings before
there is an explosion." Id.
317. Id. at 224.
318. Id. at 229.
319. See supra Part IV.B, IV.C.
320. Note, the Charter and the Norms were developed after Cardinal Bernard Law committed
the acts considered here. For purposes of illustrating the use of the tort of clergy malpractice,
the Charter and the Norms are used retroactively as if they were in effect at the time of the
previously described events.
321. See supra Part IV.B, IV.D.
322. CHARTER, supra note 39, at 8. Although the measures include specific religious duties,
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transferring a priest or deacon from one residence to another, the bishop
should forward all information indicating the priest's danger to children and
young people.32 3 As shown by the facts stated above, Cardinal Law failed to
promptly remove Father Geoghan and instead shuffled him from one parish
to the next without adequately informing the subsequent parishes of the
danger Geoghan posed.
The second element of the tort of clergy malpractice requires that the
offense relate to a parishioner's relationship based on counseling or
conduct.324 Therefore the offense must be tied to the cleric's duties and
relationship to a specific parishioner. Holding the cleric to a standard
encompassing the entire congregation would be too broad. In that instance,
any deviation from a parishioner's perceived expectations would give rise to
a claim of clergy malpractice. However, by focusing on the relationship
between a parishioner and a cleric in a counseling environment, courts can
narrow the scope of the tort. A counseling relationship, however, need not be
formal and should include mentoring, counseling, and educational situations.
Oftentimes clerics mentor in an informal manner. Because of the sensitivity
of religion, these situations are similar to counseling and should be considered
as such. Applying such a standard to Cardinal Law, the offense - the failure
to properly remove and inform parishioners about Father Geoghan - related
to particular parishioners - those who were subsequently abused by
Geoghan. Cardinal Law's failure to properly inform the subsequent parishes
placed additional children at risk.
The third element of the tort of clergy malpractice is that the cause of action
must be based on outrageous conduct.325 Claiming that liability should result
from any conduct stemming from a counseling relationship between a cleric
and parishioner would be too broad of an assertion. The conduct must be
outrageous conduct, which is "[c]onduct so extreme that it exceeds all
reasonable bounds of human decency." '326 Examples of outrageous conduct
could include sexual misconduct, sexual exploitation, sexual harassment,
breach of cleric confidentiality, or breach of the church's secular policy
regarding sexual misconduct or exploitation. In the facts surrounding
Cardinal Law's continued shuffling of Father Geoghan, Law's failure to
follow the transfer requirements by not fully disclosing Geoghan's medical
history and instances of recidivism surely qualifies as outrageous. Cardinal
the procedure itself does not delve into religious doctrine, making the procedure more secular
than religious.
323. Id. at 12.
324. See supra Part IV.B.
325. See supra Part W.B.




Law placed many young children in harm's way by allowing Geoghan to
continue his ministry without supervision.
The fourth element of the tort of clergy malpractice requires that the
conduct stemming from the relationship with the cleric must cause a definable
physical injury in the parishioner.327 A bodily injury is "[p]hysical damage to
a person's body."32 Parishioners cannot recover for injuries that lack fact or
substance. Mere injury to reputation would be insufficient to establish a cause
of action under clergy malpractice. This requirement narrows the class of
victims to those who actually were harmed, either physically or emotionally.
Sexual misconduct and sexual exploitation are two prime examples of how
clergy malpractice could result in a physical and/or emotional injury, and
medical testimony could prove the injury. However, proving injury might be
more difficult in cases involving breaches of cleric confidentiality. For a case
such as Cardinal Law's, the definable physical injury stems from the abuse at
the hands of a known pedophile. By transferring Father Geoghan, rather than
removing him from the ministry, Cardinal Law allowed Father Geoghan full
access to unsuspecting children.
Finally, the plaintiff parishioner whose injury is at issue must have relied
upon the cleric's counseling, advice, or conduct.32 9 Counseling or conduct
without reliance is insufficient to establish a claim for clergy malpractice. In
cases of confidentiality and counseling, the parishioner would have to show
that he took some action based upon the cleric's conduct or counseling. In
sexual misconduct, abuse, or exploitation cases, the parishioner could meet
this requirement by showing that he developed a relationship with the cleric
and accepted his counseling and/or conduct as essential to that relationship.
For a case against Cardinal Law, to satisfy the final element of the tort of
clergy malpractice, the plaintiff-parishioner would have to prove that he relied
upon Cardinal Law's transfer as a sign that Father Geoghan was a good priest
or a safe priest. Some action, relying on Cardinal Law's constant support of
Geoghan, would have to be taken to prove the final element.
The foundation of the tort of clergy malpractice creates a narrowly
applicable tort. The plaintiff-parishioner must prove a prima facie case based
on a specific standard of care, breach, and reliance on his part. By focusing
the definition, the tort of clergy malpractice does not subject the church to
unrestrained liability. However, the tort does allow victims of misconduct and
exploitation to remedy their lives.
327. See supra Part IV.B.
328. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 789 (7th ed. 1999).
329. See supra Part IV.B.
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VI. Conclusion
The tort of clergy malpractice fills a gap in modem tort law. With
numerous jurisdictions accepting and rejecting different theories of liability,
tort law needs a uniform approach for victims of clergy sexual misconduct.
Even though no court has yet accepted the tort,33° the tort of clergy malpractice
would establish a standardized method of recovery. Battery, negligent or
intentional infliction of emotional distress, breach of fiduciary duty,
respondeat superior, and negligent hiring and supervision fail to provide an
adequate remedy in a context of clergy cases. The tort of clergy malpractice
satisfies that void without violating the First Amendment when approached
from a secular standard of care. By defining the cleric's standard of care
through the secular documents establishing personnel policies, the court can
avoid excessive entanglement and judge the conduct based on actions, not
religious dogma. With public outcry about the religious scandal and public
support to remedy the wrongs of the past, the courts can offer victims of abuse
and misconduct a chance to recover for the pain and suffering that continues
today.
Emily C. Short
330. Dausch v. Rykse, 52 F.3d 1425, 1432 (7th Cir. 1994).
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